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PREEMPTION OF PRIVATE REMEDIES IN
INTERSTATE WATER POLLUTION DISPUTES:
INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY V OULLETTE

INTRODUCTION
InternationalPaper Co. v. Oullette (IPC)' addresses the preemptive
effect of federal statutory law controlling interstate water pollution on
state causes of action in nuisance. The question presented to the United
States Supreme Court in IPC was "whether the [Clean Water] Act preempts
a common-law nuisance suit filed in a Vermont court under Vermont law,
when the source of the alleged injury is located in New York."' Although
in previous cases the Supreme Court had ruled that federal common law
of nuisance applied to interstate water pollution,' then later held that
federal statutory law preempted federal common law,4 the Court had
declined to address the application of state common law until IPC.5 As
a result, a split arose in the circuit courts regarding application of state
law to interstate water pollution conflicts. 6
In IPC, the Supreme Court resolved the split by deciding that the Clean
Water Act precludes application of an affected state's common law against
an out-of-state polluter.7 By preempting application of an affected state's
common law, the Supreme Court ostensibly clarified the law governing
interstate water pollution. In reality, the Court left the litigation waters
as murky as ever. While the Court affirmatively decided that the Clean
Water Act preempts the common law of the affected state, it did not
adequately address the implied distinction between applying the common
law of an "affected" state (impermissable) and a "source" state (permissable). Nor did the Court satisfactorily describe alternative remedies
for aggrieved individuals.
1.International Paper Co. v. Oullette, 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987) ("IPC").
2. Id. at 807.
3. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee (1972).
4. See, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois and Michigan, 451 U.S. 304, 101 S. Ct. 1784 (1981);
Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v.National Sea Clammers Assoc., 453 U.S. I (1981).
5. 451 U.S. at 310, n.4.
6. Inthe Seventh Circuit, the Court of Appeals held that state law was completely preempted by
federal statute. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1984). The Vermont Federal
District Court held that state common law remedies were not preempted. Oullette v. International
Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264 (D. Ver. 1985), aff'd, per curiam, 776 F.2d 55 (1985).
7. 107 S. Ct. at 813.
8. A source state is the state in which pollution is discharged into interstate waters. An affected
state is one where pollution in interstate water from an out-of-state source causes damage or adverse

effects.
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CASE BACKGROUND

Factual
International Paper Company operates a pulp and paper mill on Lake
Champlain near Ticonderoga, New York. Vermont lies on the other side
of Lake Champlain from the mill. The citizens on the Vermont side own
properties primarily used for residential purposes as well as for farming
and businesses such as marinas. 9 The Vermont property owners claimed
that the discharged pollutants from the paper mill made the lake waters
"foul, unhealthy, smelly, and ... unfit for recreational use."'" The resulting injury was a diminution of the Vermont property values.
Procedural
In 1970, Vermont sued New York and International Paper Company
under the United States Supreme Court's original jurisdiction." Vermont
claimed that New York and International Paper Company were responsible
for the deposit of sludge and pollution in Lake Champlain, which constituted a public nuisance. A special master presented the Court with a
consent decree proposing that a lake master would police the execution
of a settlement. The Court denied the proposal on the ground that the
states should settle the dispute by interstate compact or by agreement of
the parties. ,
3
Although the state of Vermont did enter into settlement agreements,
those agreements did not prevent a class consisting of the state of Vermont
and various citizens from pursuing a private cause of action against International Paper Company for public nuisance under state common law.
One of Plaintiff's causes of action alleged in part that 1) discharges from
the mill constituted a continuing nuisance; and 2) International Paper
Company violated its National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) permit.' 4 Plaintiffs sought money damages totaling $120 million, and an injunction. International Paper Company moved to dismiss.
It argued that 1) the paper mill was in compliance with its NPDES permit;
2) federal rather than state law was controlling; and 3) if Congress intended
to allow any state common law action, it also intended that such a suit
9. Oullette, 602 F Supp. at 266.
10. 107 S. Ct. at 807.
11. Comment, State Law Remedies for Interstate Water Pollution: The Legacy of Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 16 ELR 10136 (June 1986); Vermont v. New York, 417 U.S. 270 (1974).
12. 417 U.S. at 277-78.
13. Oullette, 602 F. Supp. at 272-74. In the settlement agreements, the state of Vermont agreed
to forbear from bringing suit against International Paper Company or from proposing stricter effluent
limitations so long as the paper mill abided by those set forth. The agreements did not extend to
harm suffered after Oct. 29, 1974, and in no way restricted the claims and rights of Vermont citizens.
14. Id. at 266. Other allegations in the suit are not pertinent to this Note.
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must be brought in the courts and under the laws of the state where the
discharge occurred (in other words, the source state).' 5

GENERAL BACKGROUND
Congress and the federal courts have grappled for decades with environmental problems, including the broad issue of federal preemption
of state law in interstate water pollution regulation. In general, Congress
may occupy an area of law that falls within its powers under the Commerce
Clause, to the exclusion of any state law or federal common law.' 6 In
areas where Congress has not exclusively occupied the field, state law
may also be preempted to the extent it conflicts with federal law. 7 Additionally, Congress may explicitly except state law governing specific
sub-areas in a field otherwise occupied by federal law.
Congress regulates various sources of pollution through its broad exercise of the Commerce Clause.'" The Supreme Court has agreed with
lower federal courts which "uniformly found the power conferred by the
Commerce Clause broad enough to permit congressional regulation of
activities causing air or water pollution, or other environmental hazards
that may have effect in more than one State."'19
In the area of interstate water pollution, the scope and significance of
Congressional preemption became increasingly important as the seriousness of the problem and need for regulation grew. Congress first enacted
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) in 1948.20 The preemptive limits of the Act were highlighted in a 1972 Supreme Court case. 2'
The opinion of the Milwaukee I Court was that the basic interests of
federalism, and a need for uniformity, required application of federal
15. Id.
16. United States Constitution, art.
I §8, cl.3; see Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
17. See, e.g., PG&E (cited in note 16), Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp, 464 U.S. 238 (1984);
Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). For a thorough discussion of federal preemption
in the context of pollution regulation, see Glicksman, Federal Preemption and Private Legal Remedies
for Pollution, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121 (1985).
18. Congress regulates pollutions through statutes such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401;
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §4321; Toxic Substance Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §2601 (as well as many others.)
19. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. & Reclam. Assn., 452 U.S. 264, 282 (1981); see also,
Glicksman at 175 (cited in note 17).
20. Act of June 30, 1948, 62 Stat. 1155. The original act emphasized the state's role in enforcing
water quality standards.
21. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972) (Milwaukee 1). The state of Illinois filed
suit against four cities and two local sewerage commissions of the state of Wisconsin. Defendants'
sewers overflowed with heavy rains, causing raw sewage and other wastes to be discharged into
Lake Michigan. Illinois sought abatement of the public nuisance.
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law.22 In applying the FWPCA to the situation, the Court stated, "[Tihe
Act makes clear that it is federal, not state law that in the end controls
the pollution of interstate

. . .

waters. "23

However, the Milwaukee I Court found that the federal statute did not
adequately occupy the field of interstate water pollution because no remedy was available to Illinois under the Act. Because the Court found the
interests of federalism to be paramount over state law, it decided that
federal common law remedies in nuisance should be applied to fill in any
gaps left by Congress in the FWPCA. The Act proved to be inadequate:
Congress amended it in 1972, five months after the Milwaukee I decision.24 Congress extensively revised the Act, and added a comprehensive,
national regulatory system.25
In 1981, with the reappearance of the dispute between Illinois and the
City of Milwaukee, the Supreme Court ruled that the FWPCA Amendments were extensive enough to preempt federal common law nuisance
suits for interstate water pollution, in favor of statutory remedies now
provided.26 "The establishment of such a self-consciously comprehensive
program by Congress, which certainly did not exist when Illinois v Milwaukee was decided, strongly suggests that there is no room for courts
to attempt to improve on that program with federal common law." 27 The
analysis in determining whether federal common law was superceded
rested on the assumption "that it is for Congress, not federal courts, to
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of federal
law. 2 8
The Court's initial concern in Milwaukee I had been that Illinois did
not have any forum in which to protect its interests unless federal common
law was created. In the 1972 Amendments, Congress not only created a
22. 406 U.S. at 105. The Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the Act was that the state law
of the state within which pollution caused a nuisance was controlling in interstate water pollution
disputes. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), overruled, Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
23. 406 U.S. at 102.
24. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92,500, 86 Stat.
816, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1982)). The Amendments
restructured the Act around a permit system for pollution discharges into navigable waters.
25. 33 U.S.C. § 1341-45.
26. The Court stated:
We conclude that . . . Congress has not left the formulation of appropriate federal
standards to the courts through application of often vague and indeterminate nuisance
concepts ... but rather has occupied the field through the establishment of a comprehensive regulatory program. . . . The 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act were not merely another law "touching interstate waters" ...
and found inadequate to supplant federal law.
451 U.S. at 317. Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. I (1981);
Glicksman, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 121 (1985).
27. 451 U.S. at 319.
28. Id. at 317.
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regulatory structure that comprehensively governed pollution discharges
into navigable waters, it also "provided ample opportunity for a state
affected by decisions of a neighboring state's permit-granting agency to
seek redress."' 29 The forum for the pursuit of claims regarding stringency
of standards is before the expert agencies controlling the permit process.
Although the 1972 Amendments preempted federal common law, the
Milwaukee II decision distinguished preemption of state law as an issue
not yet before the court.3" While the FWPCA is the exlusive source of
federal law, Congress recognized and encouraged "the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution. "I'
Central to this goal is the FWPCA's permit structure, the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES).32
Permits are issued by either the Environmental Protection Agency or
by states that establish a permit program at least as strict as the federal
program. 3 It gives the states power to adopt and administer more stringent
standards than those used in the federal administration of effluent discharge permit programs. Where a state chooses to implement its own
program, the Act provides for affected states to voice objections to the
standards set.34 The federal administrator of NPDES has oversight authority over the state programs.35 However, the statute does not indicate
that objections from another state would necessarily be sufficient grounds
for denial of a permit by either the source state or the federal official.
While the statute encourages the development of uniform (and perhaps
more stringent) state laws as well as cooperation among the states, it does
so within the comprehensive confines of federal regulation.
Thus federal law is paramount except to the extent it expressly permits
recourse to state law. In interpreting the FWPCA's degree of preemption,
the courts have focused on two sections-Section 510 and Section 505(e). 6
The first declares that a State's rights or jurisdiction governing state waters
(including boundary waters) will not be affected except through specific
federal provisions within the FWPCA.37 The second section states, "nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person . . . may have
under any statute or common law to seek enforcement of any effluent
29. 451 U.S. 326 (citing §402(b)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(3).
30. See 451 U.S. at 319, n.14. The appellate court had also declined to address the state law
claims. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 171 n.53 (7th Cir. 1979).
31. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).
32. 33 U.S.C. § 1342-1345. NPDES provides for a nationwide system of permits for all entities
which discharge pollutants into navigable waters.
33. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (b).
34. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
35. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).

36. 33 U.S.C. §.1370(2) and 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e).
37. 33 U.S.C. § 1370(2).
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standard or limitation or to seek any other relief."s What types of state
common law remedies the FWPCA allows depends on the interpretation
of these provisions. For instance, the Milwaukee 11 Court did not find
this section applicable to federal law. It was only relevant to the effect
of citizen's suits, not the Act as a whole.39
When the Milwaukee H1 Court remanded the case, the Seventh Circuit
ruled that the saving clause referred only to application of the common
law of the state in which the discharge occurred.' The court interpreted
the section to cover only the right and jurisdiction of a state to regulate
water within its boundaries. That interpretation is based on the premise
that states have never had a right to regulate or exercise jurisdiction over
extraterritorial waters. 4' Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit interpreted the
saving clause to apply only to regulation of discharges that occur inside
the state. 42 It followed that the FWPCA preempted application of the
injured state's common law cause of action, because its courts had no
jurisdiction to regulate discharges occurring in another state. 43
To allow an injured state to do so would effectively give that state
regulatory power over another state. The Milwaukee Seventh CircuitCourt
reasoned that providing remedies in an injured state imposed that state's
water pollution standards and regulations upon the citizens of the source
state. Such an application of common law directly affects the apportionment of water use by imposing higher costs on polluters, with the same
result as if more stringent permit standards had been imposed.' Dischargers would have to meet the regulatory and common law standards
imposed not only by their own state, but by all downstream states affected
by the discharge (such questions arise as: how far downstream can you
go before the system is no longer affected?). The court envisioned chaotic
confrontations between states and an end to the uniformity and cooperation made possible by the FWPCA.45 When Illinois appealed the Seventh
Circuit's ruling on the application of state common law, the Supreme
Court denied certiorari.46
In the meantime, the Vermont Federal District Court had essentially
the same issue before it with the Oullette case.47 Could plaintiffs pursue
state common-law nuisance remedies against defendant's continuing dis38. 33 U.SC. § 1365(e), emphasis added.
39. 451 U.S. at 328-29.
40. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403, 414 (7th Cir. 1984) (Milwaukee 7th).
41. Id. at 413.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 414.
44. 731 F.2d at 410.
45. Id. at 414.
46. Scott v,City of Hammond, 469 U.S. i 196. 105 S. Ct. 979 (1985) (consolidated with the
Illinois case).
47. Oullette, 602 F. Supp. 264.
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charge of effluent? The issue was not the existence of federal preemption
(already a given), but the "extent to which Congress authorized, either
expressly or implicitly, resort to state common law in a situation such as
this." 4 The district court delayed ruling until the Seventh Circuit reached
a decision in the Illinois-Milwaukee dispute, before reaching its own
conclusions.
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit's ruling, the Vermont court held that
the common law remedies of the injured state were not preempted under
FWPCA 9 The court found it "inconceivable that Congress intended to
deprive a party injured by water pollution of all compensation for that
injury." 5' It rejected the Seventh Circuit's interpretation that the savings
clause and citizens' suit provisions of the Act only applied a state's
nuisance law to in-state discharges, rather than those from another state.5
It based its decision on the view that Congress had not drawn distinctions
between in-state and out-of-state sources of pollution in providing for
additional remedies. The court viewed the saving clause and accompanying state authority clause as supplements to the Act and its permit
system.52 Using state common law remedies did not directly impose the
full regulatory powers of one state upon the citizens of another state.
Rather, its use was merely a means of redress to a specific, injured private
party. 3 The district court's decision was affirmed per curiam by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals.' The Supreme Court granted certiorari
from the Second Circuit in order to resolve the conflict between the
Seventh and Second Circuits."
CASE ANALYSIS
After hearing the IPC case, the Supreme Court resolved the Circuit
split in favor of the Seventh Circuit's logic. The IPC Court first looked
to the 1972 Amendments and found them sufficiently comprehensive to
raise the presumption that Congress intended to preempt all state law
actions unless expressly preserved. 56 Looking at the permit structure of
the FWPCA, the Court focused on the role of "source" and "affected"
states in the permit process. The court concluded that affected states held
only an advisory role in regulating pollution that is discharged pursuant
to the regulations of and within the boundaries of the source state. 57
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 268.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 269.
Id.
Id. at 271.
Id. at 271.
776 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1985).
475 U.S. 108 (1986).
107 S.Ct. at 811.
Id. at 810.
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With that background in mind, the Court viewed the issue in terms of
whether Vermont law (the affected state law) conflicted with federal law,
and thus was preempted. The Court held that in addition to comprehensive
regulation of interstate water pollution, the FWPCA provided its own
remedies.5" By the Court's interpretation, the state law remedies "saved"
by the statute were applicable only within the constraints of the statutory
remedies-that is, the citizens-suits provisions.59 Therefore, the existence
of the savings clause in no way precluded preemption of state law remedies
by the Act itself. The issue remaining was whether the use of state law
remedies interfered with the methods and goals of the FWPCA and were
preempted for that reason.
The Court ruled that in this case the application of Vermont law against
IPC would allow the state of Vermont and its citizens to circumvent the
NPDES permit system, and upset the interests addressed by the Act."
Their conclusion was based on the opinion that if a polluter in New York
was held liable for violations of Vermont's standards, the polluter would
be forced to comply with those standards. If a downstream state's permit
standards are more stringent, then that state effectively regulates the outof-state sources, thereby infringing on the sovereignty of the source state.6"
The Court did not address the obverse of this argument. Once remedies
are viewed as a regulatory tool, rather than a supplement to regulation,
any variations in standards inevitably lead to one state being held hostage
to the policies of the other.62 The consequence of the Supreme Court's
decision is to transform minimum upstream standards into the maximum
standards for a stream system.
Additionally, the Court did not address the inconsistency of its decision
when the affected and source states maintain comparable standards. The
logical conclusion of this decision would dictate that even though identical
regulatory and common law standards exist, application of the affected
state's law equals indirect regulation inconsistent with the structure and
goals of the FWPCA, while application of the source state's law is an
acceptable supplement to the regulatory process.
The Court's second rationale was that application of an affected state's
law undermines the efficiency and predictability of the permit system.
According to the Court, chaos would reign if permit holders had to act
58. Id. at 812. These remedies include civil and criminal penalties for permit violation, and
"citizens suits" which allow individuals to compel the EPA to enforce a permit. (citing 33 U.S.C.
§ 1319(a), 1365(a), (h)). What is foreboding about the whole issue is that there is no mention of
private remedies available to individuals for damages resulting from the discharge of effluent into
interstate water.
59. 107 S.Ct. at 812.
60. Id. at 813.
61. Id.
62. See Tennessee v. Champion International Corp., 709 S.W.2d 569 (1986), 576-580 (Drowata,
J.,dissenting).
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in accordance not only with permit standards, but also with all downstream
states' common law standards of nuisance (classified by the Court as
"vague" and "indeterminate" laws).63
The Court did find that the FWPCA does not preclude a claim brought
under the laws of the source state.' A source state has the authority to
set higher standards than those of the federal government, if the state
chooses to administer its own permit program. In addition, allowing
application of the source state's common law subjects a polluter to one
known or predictable standard of liability, rather than indeterminate and
vague standards.65
The Court continued, "[mloreover, States can be expected to take into
account their own nuisance laws in setting permit requirements."'6 The
effect of this conclusion is inconsistent with the FWPCA. If states equate
nuisance laws with permit standards, compliance with a permit could
precludeperse a nuisance action. Legislative history is clear that Congress
did not intend such a result.67 If Congress had intended the interpretation
drawn by the IPC Court, then there would have been no reason to enact
a savings clause at all. The end result of that interpretation, however, is
that injured parties are effectively left without a remedy if they are damaged by out-of-state discharges.
CONCLUSION
Although the Court resolved the split between Circuits as to whether
an affected state may apply its common law in determining remedies for
citizens injured by an out-of-state polluter, it did so by drawing artificial
distinctions between affected and source states. The Court's decision also
precludes remedies altogether where a source state equates permit standards with its common law standards, even though an injury to an affected
state and its citziens may be substantial. If a source state's common law
principles are inadequate to address water pollution disputes, injured
parties are left with no recourse. This decision represents a step backward
in effectuating the FWPCA's policy of eliminating water pollution in
interstate waters.
STACEY GOODWIN
63. 107 S. Ct. at 814.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 815.
66. Id.
67. "It should be noted, however, that [the savings clause] would specifically preserve any rights
or remedies under any other law. Thus, if damages could be shown, other remedies would remain
available. Compliance with requirements under this Act would not be a defense to a common law
action for pollution damages." [S. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 81, accompanying 33
U.S.C. 1365(e)]. Oullette v. International Paper Co., 602 F. Supp. 264, 269 (D.Ver. 1985); see
also, Comment, State Law Remedies at 10,141 (cited in note I1).

